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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Section 78-2-2 (3) (j)Utah Code Annotated and Rule 3(a)
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provide for jurisdiction in this
Court in this action, which is an appeal from a judgment granted on
all

issues

and

as

to all parties, on

Plaintiff's

Motion

for

Temporary Restraining Order and on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or
in

the

Alternative

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment

in

the

Third

Judicial District Court Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
STATEMENT OF THE
1.

ISSUES

Whether the trial court erred in concluding as a

matter of law that the statute of frauds bars Appellant's, Larry
Clayton, recovery on his contract with Appellee, Kip Eardley.
Standard of review: Trial court's legal conclusions are given no
deference but are reviewed for correctness.
P.2d 132, 133 (Utah 1992); Clover

v.

Snowbird

Malone
Ski

v.

Resort,

Parker,

826

808 P.2d

1037, 1040 (Utah 1991) .
2.

Whether

the

trial

court

erred

in

applying

the

"exclusively referable standard" to Clayton's part performance of
the contract when the parties agreed that an oral contract existed.
Standard of review: Trial court's legal conclusions are given no
deference but are reviewed for correctness.

1

Malone

v. Parker,

826

P.2d 132, 133 (Utah 1992); Clover

v.

Snowbird

Ski

Resort,

808 P.2d

1037, 1040 (Utah 1991).
3•

Whether the trial court erred in concluding as a

matter of law that Clayton's part performance of the contract was
not exclusively referable to the contract but that it was equally
referable to a series of six contracts, each having a duration of
one year.

Standard of review: Trial court's legal conclusions are

given no deference but are reviewed for correctness.
Parker,

826 P.2d

Resort,

808 P.2d 1037, 1040 (Utah 1991).
4.

132, 133

(Utah 1992);

Clover

v.

Malone

Snowbird

v.
Ski

Whether the trial court erred in granting summary

judgment for Eardley and granting Eardley his taxable costs, if
any, and whether there are genuine issues as to material facts
precluding summary judgment.

Standard of review: Trial court's

legal conclusions are granted no deference but the Appeals Court
reviews are for correctness.
231, 235

(Utah 1993), Malone

1992); Clover

v.

Snowbird

Ski

Higgins
v.

v.

Salt

Parker,

Resort,

Lake

County,

855 P. 2d

826 P.2d 132, 133

(Utah

808 P.2d 1037, 1040

(Utah

1991).
5.

Whether the trial court erred in denying Plaintiff's

Motion for Temporary Restraining Order.

Standard of review: In

reviewing cases of equity, this Court rejects the trial court's
2

findings

only

if evidence

clearly preponderates

findings or there is misapplication of the law.
P.2d 54 (Utah

against

Ryan v. Earl,

those
618

1980) .

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from an action commenced by Appellant,
Larry Clayton, to enforce an oral contract with the Appellee, Kip
Eardley, for the purchase of tickets to the Utah Jazz basketball
games. Larry Clayton sued Kip Eardley in the District Court asking
the District Court to determine that Defendant had breached the
contract with the Plaintiff fixing damages in an amount to be
determined and for a preliminary injunction enjoining the Defendant
from selling, giving away, disbursing or dividing or in any other
manner using Mr. Clayton's one-third share of the tickets and for
declaratory relief declaring that a valid and binding contract
between the parties existed and that Mr. Clayton was entitled onethird of all Utah Jazz basketball tickets for all coming years of
the Utah Jazz basketball season.

The Defendant filed a Motion to

Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment.

The lower

court granted Kip Eardley's Motion for Summary Judgment, and this
appeal by Mr. Clayton followed.

3

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant, Larry Clayton, seeks a reversal of the trial
court's Order granting Summary Judgment in favor of Appellee, Kip
Eardley and a reversal of the trial court's denial of Plaintiff's
Motion for Temporary Restraining Order.

STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT ON APPEAL
Beginning
Eardley

in

approximately

1989,

the

Appellee,

Kip

(hereinafter referred to as "Mr. Eardley"), and a Mike

Marcus, shared season tickets for two to the Utah Jazz basketball
games, which had originally been purchased in Mr. Eardley's name in
an agreement with Eardley and the Utah Jazz.

(R. 2, 3, 25, 75 and

76)
Mr. Eardley was experiencing financial difficulties in
keeping the tickets and paying for one-half of them with Mike
Marcus, and in order for Mr. Eardley to keep the season tickets,
Mr. Eardley offered and Plaintiff accepted, the right to purchase
one-third of the regular season and play-off tickets.

(R. 2, 25)

Beginning in approximately 1989, Mr. Eardley offered onethird of his regular and post-season Utah Jazz play-off tickets to
Mr. Clayton.

Mr. Clayton accepted that offer and entered into an

4

oral agreement with Mr. Eardley that for each and every year Mr.
Clayton would purchase one-third of the regular season and play-off
tickets thereof from Mr. Eardley.

(R. 2, 3, 25, 75 and 76)

On an annual basis, from 1989 through 1994, Mr. Clayton, Mr.
Eardley

and

Mr.

Marcus

met

prior

to

the

beginning

of

each

basketball season and divided up the tickets amongst them, onethird each.

A similar meeting would be held before the play-off

games and the play-off tickets would be divided in a mutually
agreeable manner, one-third to each of them.

Mr. Clayton and Mr.

Marcus would pay their one-third share directly to Mr. Eardley or
the Utah Jazz Ticket Office.

(R. 2, 3, 25, 75 and 76)

This oral contract entered into between Mr. Clayton and
Mr. Eardley provided that Mr. Clayton would have the right, each
and every year in the future, to purchase from Mr. Eardley onethird of the regular season and one-third of the play-off tickets.
This agreement and understanding was restated by Mr. Clayton, Mr.
Eardley and Mr. Marcus each year at the above-referenced meetings
when the tickets were divided.

(R. 2, 3, 25, 75 and 76)

On or

about January 1995, Mr. Eardley offered Mr. Clayton $500.00 for Mr.
Clayton's

rights in the contract to purchase one-third of the

tickets from Mr. Eardley.

Mr. Clayton rejected that offer and told

Mr. Eardley that he was not interested in selling his one-third
5

interest in the tickets.

(R. 3)

During the 1995 Utah Jazz play-off season, Mr. Clayton
sent a check

for $405.00 to the Jazz office as his one-third

purchase price of the Jazz play-off tickets, however, the Jazz
Ticket

Office

request.

returned

Mr.

Clayton's

check

at

Mr.

Eardley's

Thereafter, Mr. Eardley refused to honor the contract by

refusing to divide with Mr. Clayton his one-third of the Jazz
regular season and play-off tickets.

(R. 3 and 4)

During the period of time of the oral contract between
Mr. Clayton and Mr. Eardley, the Mr. Eardley at times either sold
or gave away part of his (Mr. Eardley's) one-third tickets and Mr.
Clayton believed that unless enjoined from doing so, Mr. Eardley
would either sell, give away or otherwise prevent Mr. Clayton from
acquiring his one-third of the season tickets for the coming years
of the Utah Jazz basketball.

(R. 4 and 5)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

In the pleadings and affidavits below, the parties

agreed that an oral contract existed for the sale of Jazz tickets
by Mr. Eardley to Mr. Clayton and show that they agreed on the
terms of said contract and that the contract had been performed by
the parties over a number of years.

6

Where the existence of an oral

contract

is

established

by

admissions

of

the

parties,

the

requirement that the acts of part performance must be exclusively
referable to the oral contract is satisfied.

The trial court erred

in concluding as a matter of law that said requirement had not been
met and that the statute of frauds therefore barred Mr. Clayton's
recovery.
2.

Even if the requirement that part performance of the

contract by Mr. Clayton must be exclusively referable to the oral
contract

is not met by an admitted oral contract between the

parties,

Mr. Clayton

raised material

questions

of

fact

as to

whether his conduct met the standard so as to preclude summary
judgment in favor of Mr. Eardley.
3.
Motion

for

The

trial

Preliminary

court

erred

Injunction

in denying Mr.
because

he

met

Clayton's
all

the

requirements of Rule 65(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
ARGUMENT
I.

WHERE THE EXISTENCE OF AN ORAL CONTRACT IS ESTABLISHED BY
ADMISSION OF THE PARTIES, THE REQUIREMENT THAT THE ACTS OF
PART PERFORMANCE MUST BE EXCLUSIVELY REFERABLE TO THE ORAL
CONTRACT IS SATISFIED.
The statute of frauds, 25-5-1 Utah Code Annotated (1953)

requires certain agreements to be in writing:

7

The following agreements are void unless the
agreement, or some note or memorandum of the
agreement is in writing, signed by the party
to be charged with the agreement:
(1) Every agreement that by its terms is
not to be performed within one year from the
making of the agreement.
However, § 25-5-8 allows part performance to remove an
oral contract from the statute in certain circumstances:
Nothing in this chapter contained shall be
construed to abridge the powers of courts to
compel the specific performance of agreements
in case of part performance thereof.
This Court has set forth the standard of sufficient part
performance in the case of Martin

v. Scholl,

678 P.2d 274 (Utah

1993) as follows: (1) the oral contract and its terms must be clear
and definite; (2) the acts done in performance of the contract must
be

equally

clear and definite; and

(3) such acts must be

in

reliance on the contract.
In this case, the first two requirements are established
by the parties' pleadings and affidavits.

opposition

(A)

The oral contract is clear and definite.

Mr.

Eardley's own affidavit

to Mr. Clayton's Motion

filed

in support

for Preliminary

of his

Injunction

establishes the existence of an oral contract and its terms and
8

conditions.

(R. 24 and 25)

In paragraph 4 of that affidavit, Mr.

Eardley states, "In approximately 1989, Affiant began offering to
sell

one-third

of

Affiant's

(Clayton) on a yearly basis."

season

tickets

to

Larry

Paragraph 5 states,"Clayton accepted

Affiant's offers each year for the years 1989 through
season".

Clayton

1994-95

And in paragraph 6 it states, "After the 1994-95 regular

season, Affiant decided not to offer to sell any more of the
Affiant's tickets to Clayton."
In

addition

to

Mr.

Eardley's

admissions

as

to

the

existence of the contract as set forth above, the trial court in
its Findings of Fact (R. 75 and 76) states in paragraphs 2, 3, 4
and 5 as follows: Paragraph 2, "Beginning in approximately 1989
Eardley offered one-third of his regular season Jazz basketball
tickets and one-third of the play-off tickets to Plaintiff Larry
Clayton."

Paragraph 3, "From 1989 through the 1994-95 season,

Clayton and Eardley orally agreed that Clayton would purchase onethird of the regular season and play-off tickets."

Paragraph 4,

"On an annual basis from 1989 to 1994, Clayton, Eardley and Marcus
met prior to the beginning of each basketball season and divided up
the tickets amongst them, one-third each.
held before

the play-off

A similar meeting was

games and the play-off

divided amongst them, one-third each.
9

tickets

were

Clayton and Marcus paid

their one-third share either directly to Eardley or to the Utah
Jazz Ticket Office."

Paragraph 5, "At the meetings where the

regular season and play-off tickets were divided, Eardley, Clayton
and Marcus discussed the agreements and agreed that the arrangement
was mutually agreeable and satisfactory and that the one-third
purchase by each would continue on an on-going basis from year to
year."

These Findings of Fact are not challenged by Mr. Eardley on

appeal and show that an oral contract was entered into and its
terms.
Plaintiff's Verified Complaint, paragraphs 3 through 9
(R. 2 and 3) set forth Plaintiff's allegation as to the existence
of the contract.

These allegations are not denied by the Defendant

and, in fact, the trial court as set forth above, found in its
Findings of Fact that a contract existed and that the terms thereof
were agreed upon by the parties.

Thus, an oral contract existed

with clear and definite terms agreed upon.
(B)

The acts done in performance of the contract must
be clear and definite.

The acts of the parties in the part performance of the
contract were indeed clear and definite.

The same sections of Mr.

Eardley's affidavit and the court's Findings of Fact as set forth
above, show that the acts were clear and definite.
10

For example,

they show that Eardley offered, and Clayton accepted, a one-third
interest in the on-going season tickets, yearly meetings were held
before each season began with the parties dividing the tickets onethird to each, with payment made by Clayton to Eardley or directly
to the Utah Jazz Ticket Office.

It is clear from the undisputed

facts as set forth above and the admissions of Mr. Eardley that the
acts done in performance of the contract were clear and definite.
Therefore, the second prong of the test is met.
(C)

The acts must be exclusively referable to the oral
contract.

The last prong of the test is met because the parties
both admit that an oral contract existed.

Paragraphs 3 through 9

of Mr. Clayton's Verified Complaint (R. 2 and 3), paragraphs 4, 5
and 6 of the June 7, 1995, Eardley affidavit (R. 25) and paragraphs
2, 3, 4 and 5 of the court's Findings of Fact (R. 75 and 76) show
that Clayton alleged, Eardley admitted, and the trial court found
that an oral contract existed between the parties.
This Court, in In Re:

Roth's

Estate,

269 P.2d 278 (Utah

1954) acknowledged the exclusively referable rule stating:
It is true, as appellant argues, that the acts
of part performance must be exclusively
referable
to the contract
in that the
possession of the party seeking specific
performance and the improvements made by him
11

must be reasonably explicable only on the
postulate that a contract exists. p. 281.
However, the Court goes on to state, citing Corbin

on

Contracts,

Section 430, that where the existence of the oral contract is
established by admission of the party resisting performance, that
the

requirement

that

the

acts

of

part

performance

must

be

exclusively referable to the oral contract is satisfied. Id.

p.

281.
More
Scholl,
Roth's

supra,
Estate.

case of Martin

v.

has reaffirmed the ruling and holding in In

Re:

recently,

In Martin,

this Court

in the

this Court stated, "Where the contract

is admitted or strong independent acts which prove the contract
exists, the requirement of exclusively referable acts has been
relaxed."

Id.

p. 277.

The Court then went on to cite the ruling

and holding in the In Re:

Roth's

Estate

case and quoted Roth's

as

follows:
Where the existence of the oral contract is
established by an admission of the party
resisting specific performance or by competent
evidence independent of the acts of part
performance, the requirement that the acts of
part performance must be exclusively referable
to the oral contract is satisfied. p. 278.
Mr. Eardley admits to the existence of the contract in
his June 7, 1995, affidavit in paragraphs 3 and 4 thereof as set

12

forth above.

Furthermore, the trial court found, unchallenged by

Mr. Eardley, in its Findings of Fact paragraph 3 as set forth above
that, "From 1989 through 1994-95 season, Clayton and Eardley orally
agreed that Clayton would purchase one-third of the regular season
and play-off season tickets."
Utah law is clear regarding this issue on appeal.

Where,

as here, the existence of an oral contract is admitted by the party
resisting its enforcement, as Mr. Eardley is, the requirement that
Mr. Clayton's acts be "exclusively referable" to the contract is,
in fact, satisfied.
However, the lower court committed reversible error when
in

spite

of

the

existence

of

a clear

oral

contract,

in

its

Conclusions of Law, in paragraph 3 and 4 thereof, it held that Mr.
Clayton's

alleged

partial

performance

of

the

contract

is not

exclusively referable to the contract and that the exception to the
statute of frauds of partial performance is not available to Mr.
Clayton

since

the

contact

alleged

by

the

Plaintiff

is

not

exclusively referable to a single contract with a term of more than
one year.
that

an

The trial court ignored the admitted fact and conclusion
oral

contract

existed

and

went

on

"exclusively referable acts" by Mr. Clayton.

13

to

still

require

The trial court based

its decision to grant

summary

judgment to Mr. Eardley based upon the above-referenced Conclusions
of Law that the ''exclusively referable" test was not met.

The case

law cited above, however, and the facts of this case as shown, show
that, in fact, such test was met.
Therefore, because the trial court erred in granting
summary judgment to Eardley based on its erroneous conclusion that
the standard had not been met, when in fact, it had, and because
the other two prongs of the test for taking an oral contract out of
the statute of frauds were met, summary judgment was improper and
should be reversed.
II.

MATERIAL QUESTIONS OF FACTS EXIST AS TO CLAYTON'S
PERFORMANCE SO AS TO PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

PART

Even if the requirement of "exclusively referable" to the
contract was not satisfied by the admitted existence of the oral
contract by Mr. Eardley, material questions of fact exist that
preclude summary judgment in Mr. Eardley's favor.

On appeal from

summary judgment, the facts are viewed in a light most favorable to
the party opposing the Motion.

Baldwin

v.

Burton,

850 P.2d 1188

(Utah 1993) . And summary judgment is appropriate only when there
is no genuine

issue of material

fact and the moving party is

entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

14

Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure 56(c), Higgins

v.

Salt

Lake

County,

855 P.2d 231 (Utah

1993) .
The facts, when viewed most favorably to Mr. Clayton,
show that his performance evidence the existence of the contract
and was not reasonably explainable on any other ground, or at
least, a material question of fact remains on that issue.
For

example,

Mr.

Clayton's

Verified

Complaint

in

paragraphs 1 through 9 show only one contract with Mr. Eardley,
that yearly meetings were held to divide the tickets, that Mr.
Clayton paid Mr. Eardley or the Utah Jazz Ticket Office for the
tickets and that Mr. Clayton refused an offer in 1995 by Mr.
Eardley to purchase Mr. Clayton's right to a one-third interest in
the tickets.

(R. 2, 3 and 4) Indeed, Mr. Eardley in his affidavit

of June 7, 1995, does not deny these sworn allegations, but in
fact, admits to an offer and acceptance.

No other explanation of

Mr. Clayton's acts are advanced by Mr. Eardley, nor how his actions
are part of anything but their oral contract.
It

even

appears

from

the

record

that,

in

fact,

no

material question of fact exists that Mr. Clayton's actions were
entirely referable to the oral contract in question and not some
other agreement or venture between the parties.

For example, Mr.

Eardley does not set forth in any affidavit any other reason why
15

Mr. Clayton would meet with Mr. Eardley, divide up and purchase the
Jazz season tickets.
This Court in Martin

v. Scholl,

supra,

states that the

performance must be in some degree evidential of the existence of
the contract not readily explainable on any other ground.

p. 275.

The Court then goes on to agree with Professor Corbin in his
Treatise
more

on Contracts,
conclusive

2 Corbin on Contracts, Section 442, that the

the

direct

proof

of

the

contract,

the

stringent the requirement of exclusively referable acts.

less

Id.

p.

278.
Therefore,

because

Mr.

Clayton's

acts,

viewing

the

evidence most favorably to him, cannot be explained on any other
ground
earlier

than

the oral

shown was

contract

clear

and

in question, which

definite

as

to

its

contract
terms,

as

there

remains, at a minimum, a question of fact that precluded summary
judgment in favor of Mr. Eardley.

Therefore, this Court should

reverse the summary judgment in favor of Mr. Eardley and reinstate
the case.
III. THE COURT'S DENIAL OF MR. CLAYTON'S PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION WAS
REVERSIBLE ERROR.
Based on his Verified Complaint, Mr. Clayton moved the
court for a preliminary injunction.

16

In response, Mr. Eardley

submitted an affidavit dated June 7, 1995.
affidavit

did

not

refute

the

sworn

(R. 24 and 25) This

allegations

of

Clayton's

Complaint with respect to the grounds for a preliminary injunction.
In paragraphs 14 through 18 of the Verified Complaint, Clayton
alleged that given Mr. Eardley's past conduct of giving, selling or
disposing of his own one-third of the Jazz season tickets, that
unless

an

injunction

Clayton's one-third

were

issued,

Eardley

shares before the court

might

dispose

could resolve

of
the

matter.
The trial court made no Findings of Fact regarding these
allegations and entered no Conclusions of Law with respect thereto.
Rather, the court appears to have denied the preliminary injunction
only because it granted summary judgment to Eardley on the statute
of frauds claim.
court

states,

"As

In paragraph 8 of the Conclusions of Law, the
a

result

of

the

dismissal

of

the

action,

Plaintiff is not entitled to relief by virtue of his Complaint or
his Motion for Preliminary Injunction."

(R. 78)

Therefore, if the Court reverses the trial court and
reinstates the case, Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction
should be granted since the Plaintiff in his Verified Complaint
alleged compliance with Rule 65 (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil
17

Procedure, and the allegations were not contested by any affidavit
or sworn statement of Mr. Eardley.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Clayton seeks reversal of the trial court's granting
of summary judgment in favor of Mr. Eardely and the denial of his
Motion for Preliminary Injunction.

The statute of frauds does not

bar the relief sought by Mr. Clayton because the parties admit the
existence of an oral contract and, therefore, the

"exclusively

referable" requirement needed in order to take the contract out of
the statute of frauds, was met, contrary to the Findings by the
trial court.

Further, genuine issues of material fact were raised

that preclude summary judgment.
DATED this

/ U

day of January, 1996.
TAYLOR, ENNENGA, ADAMS & LOWE

Ferre
Cttorneys for
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J,
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Plaintiff/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the
foregoing were mailed postage prepaid this /&

day of January,

1996, to the following:
Dennis Poole
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
4543 South 700 East, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107

/^>t^. _
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ADDENDUM TO B R I E F OF APPELLANT
1.

F i n d i n g s of F a c t and C o n c l u s i o n s of Law.

2.

Judgment.

3.

Verified Complaint.

4.

Affidavit of Kip Eardley, June 7, 1995.

5.

Statute of Frauds
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DENNIS K. POOLE
[2625]
ANDREA NUFFER
[6623]
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant
4543 South 700 East, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 263-3344
Telefax:
(801) 263-1010

Third .Judicial District

SEP t 5 1995

Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LARRY CLAYTON,
Plaintiff,

:

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

- vs.
Case No. 950903536
KIP EARDLEY

:
JUDGE WILLIAM B. BOHLING

Defendant.

Plaintiff's

Motion

:

for Temporary

Restraining

Order and

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative Motion for
Summary Judgment in the above-entitled matter came on for hearing
on August 28, 1995. Plaintiff was present and was represented by
L. Mark Ferre of and for Taylor, Ennenga, Adams & Lowe. Defendant
was represented by Dennis K. Poole of and for Dennis K. Poole &
Associates, P.C. The Court having considered Plaintiff's Motion
for Preliminary Injunction, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or in the
Alternative Motion for Summary Judgment, the memoranda in support

EARDLEY.FOF (AN)
NE001-06436

000074

and in opposition thereof, the affidavit of Kip Eardley, and having
received and considered the argument of counsel, the Court now
makes and enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
The following factual allegations, taken from Plaintiff's
Complaint, were presumed to be true for purposes of Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss:
1.

Prior to 1989, Defendant Kip Eardley ("Eardley11) and Mike

Marcus ("Marcus") shared season tickets for two, to the Utah Jazz
basketball games, which tickets had originally been purchased in
Eardley's name through an agreement between Eardley and the Utah
Jazz.
2.

Beginning in approximately 1989, Eardley offered one-

third of his regular season Jazz basketball tickets and one-third
of the play-off tickets to Plaintiff Larry Clayton ("Clayton").
3.

From 1989 through the 1994-95 season, Clayton and Eardley

orally agreed that Clayton would purchase one-third of the regular
season and play-off tickets.
4.

On an annual basis from 1989 to 1994, Clayton, Eardley

and Marcus met prior to the beginning of each basketball season and
divided up the tickets amongst them, one-third each.

A similar

meeting was held before the play-off games and the play-off tickets
were divided amongst them, one-third each. Clayton and Marcus paid

EARDLEY.FOF (AN)
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their one-third share either directly to Eardley or to the Utah
Jazz ticket office.
5.

At the meetings where the regular season and play-off

tickets were divided, Eardley, Clayton and Marcus discussed the
arrangements and agreed that the arrangement was mutually agreeable
and satisfactory and that the one-third purchase by each would
continue on an on-going basis from year to year.
The

following

facts, while

not

included

in Plaintiff's

Complaint, were supported by affidavits and were not disputed by
Plaintiff:
6.

No written contract was entered into between Eardley and

Clayton^and no other written memoranda executed by Eardley existed
regarding the disposition of one-third of Eardley's Utah Jazz
tickets.
7.

The Utah Jazz sold season tickets to Eardley on an annual

basis, and they reserved the right to refuse to sell season tickets
to anyone.
8.

Other than the Verified Complaint, Clayton offered no

affidavits in support of his Motion for Preliminary Injunction or
in opposition to Eardley's Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative
Motion for Summary Judgment.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and
enters its:

EARDLEY.FOF (AN)
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

There is no genuine issue of material fact existing

relative to the issues before the Court.
2.

Plaintiff alleges the existence of an oral contract which

can not be performed within one (1) year. No written agreement or
memoranda signed by Defendant Eardley exists which evidences the
agreement.
3.

Although Plaintiff alleges partial performance of the

contract, the conduct alleged by Plaintiff is not exclusively
referable to the contract alleged by Plaintiff.
4.

The evidence amply demonstrates that the conduct alleged

by Plaintiff is equally referable to a series of six contracts each
having a duration of one year as it is to a single contract for a
term of more than one year.
5.

The Statute of Frauds is a rule of substantive law which

prohibits enforcement of a contract not in writing which is not to
be performed in one year.
6.

The

exception

to

the Statute of

Frauds

of partial

performance is not available to Plaintiff since the conduct alleged
by Plaintiff is not exclusively referable to a single contract for
a term of more than one year.
7.

Defendant is entitled to judgment no cause of action in

accordance with his Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative Motion
for Summary Judgment.

EARDLEY.FOF (AN)
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8.

As a result of the dismissal of the action, Plaintiff is

not entitled to relief by virtue of his Complaint or his Motion for
Preliminary Injunction.
9.

Defendant is entitled to his taxable costs, if any.

DATED this

15

day of

^(I>QJ04*Jk^

, 1995.

BY THE COURT:

WILLIAM B. BOHLING
District Court Judge

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

L. Mark Ferre, Esq.
TAYLOR, ENNENGA, ADAMS & LOWE
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DENNIS K. POOLE
[2625]
ANDREA NUFFER
[6623]
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant
4543 South 700 East, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 263-3344
Telefax:
(801) 263-1010

Third -judicial District

SEP 1 5
SALI LAKe C<5uNp
Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LARRY CLAYTON,
ORDER AND JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,

vs.
Case No. 950903536
KIP EARDLEY
JUDGE WILLIAM B. BOHLING
Defendant.

Plaintiff's

Motion

for

Temporary

Restraining

Order

and

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative Motion for
Summary Judgment in the above-entitled matter came on for hearing
August 28, 1995.

Plaintiff was present and was represented by L.

Mark Ferre of and for Taylor, Ennenga, Adams & Lowe. Defendant was
represented by Dennis K. Poole of and for Dennis K. Poole &
Associates, P.C.

The court having reviewed the file, having heard

the arguments of counsel, having entered Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, and for good cause appearing,

EARDLEY.ORD (AN)
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as follows:
1.

Plaintiff's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order is

hereby denied.
2.

Defendant

is

entitled

to

Summary

Judgment

against

Plaintiff no cause of action on all claims.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT entered this 1^3 day of
1995
BY THE COURT:

WILLIAM B. BOHLING
District Court Judge

____>
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I do hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER AND JUDGMENT in Case No.
950903536 to the following:
L. Mark Ferre, Esq.
TAYLOR, ENNENGA, ADAMS & LOWE
2180 South 1300 East, Suite 520
Salt Lake City, Utah
84106
and by depositing the same, sealed, with first-class postage
prepaid thereon, in the United States Mails at Salt Lake City, Utah
this

day of September, 1995.

Susan C. Held

EARDLEY.ORD (AN)
NE001-06436
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L. Mark Ferre, # 1065

TAYLOR, ENNENGA, ADAMS & LOWE
Attorneys for Plaintiff
2180 South 1300 East, Suite 520
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Telephone: (801)486-1112

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
LARRY CLAYTON,

VERIFIED COMPLAINT

Plaintiff,
Case No.

v.
KIP EARDLEY,

Judge:

Defendant.
-oooOooo-

COMES NOW the Plaintiff and for causes of action against the Defendant alleges
as follows:
1.

Both Plaintiff and Defendant are residents of Salt Lake County and the

contract sued upon herein was entered into and was to be performed in Salt Lake County and,
therefore, jurisdiction and venue are proper in this Court.
2.

Upon information and belief Plaintiff alleges that, prior to approximately

1989, the Defendant and Mike Marcus shared season tickets for two to the Utah Jazz basketball
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games, which had originally been purchased in Defendant's name through an agreement between
the Defendant and the Utah Jazz.
3.

Beginning approximately 1989, the Defendant offered one-third of the regular

season Jazz basketball tickets and one-third of the play-off tickets to the Plaintiff. Defendant was
experiencing financial difficulties in keeping the tickets and paying for one-half of them with Mike
Marcus and, therefore, in order for Defendant to be able to keep the season tickets, Defendant offered
and Plaintiff accepted the right to purchase one-third of the regular season and play-off tickets.
4.

From and after 1989, the Plaintiff and Defendant have had an oral agreement

that each and every year Plaintiff would purchase one-third of the regular season and play-off tickets,
Mike Marcus would purchase one-third thereof and Defendant would purchase one-third thereof.
5.

Each and every year from and after 1989, the Plaintiff, the Defendant and

Mike Marcus would meet prior to the beginning of each basketball season and divide up the tickets
amongst them, one-third each in a mutually agreeable fashion. A similar meeting would be held
before the play-off games and the play-off tickets were divided in a mutually agreeable manner, onethird to each of them. Plaintiff and Mike Marcus would pay their one-third share either directly to
Defendant or to the Utah Jazz ticket office.
6.

At these meetings where the regular season and play-off tickets were divided,

the Plaintiff and Defendant and Mike Marcus discussed the arrangements and agreed that the
arrangement was mutually agreeable and satisfactory and that the one-third purchase by each would
continue on an on-going basis from year to year.
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7.

The contract entered into between the Plaintiff and the Defendant provided

that the Plaintiff would have the right, each and every year in the future, to purchase from the
Defendant one-third of the regular season tickets and one-third of the play-off tickets. This
agreement and understanding was restated by the Plaintiff, Defendant and Mike Marcus each year
at the above-referenced meetings when the tickets were divided.
8.

In each of the years above referenced up through the present, the Plaintiff

would make payment for his one-third of the basketball tickets either to the Utah Jazz office or to
Mr. Eardley.
9.

On or about January 1995, the Defendant offered the Plaintiff $500.00 for his

rights in the contract to purchase one-third of the tickets as above referenced. The Plaintiff rejected
that offer and told the Defendant that he was not interested in selling his one-third interest.
10.

During the 1994-1995 basketball season, the Utah Jazz became eligible to play

in the play-offs. Pursuant to the above-referenced contract and agreement of the parties, the Plaintiff
on March 14, 1995, sent a check for $405.00 to the Utah Jazz office as the Plaintiffs one-third
purchase price of the Jazz play-off tickets.
11.

Shortly thereafter, the Utah Jazz ticket office returned the Plaintiffs check

with a note indicating that he should call Kip Eardley, giving the phone number of Mr. Eardley.
12.

The Plaintiff attempted repeatedly to contact Mr. Eardley to discuss why his

check was returned and when he could expect his one-third of the basketball play-off tickets.
13.

Despite repeated demands for his one-third of the play-off tickets, the

Defendant failed and refused to give him his one-third of the tickets. The Plaintiff has also tendered
Page 3 of 8
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to the Defendant his one-third share of the cost of the play-off tickets for the 1994-1995 season but
that tender has been refused by the Defendant.
14.

During the period of time of the contract between the Plaintiff and the

Defendant, the Defendant has at times either sold or given away part of the Defendant's one-third
share of the tickets. Plaintiff believes that unless enjoined from doing so, the Defendant will either
sell, give away or otherwise prevent the Plaintiff from acquiring his one-third of the season tickets
for the coming years of the Utah Jazz basketball.
15.

Based upon Defendant's past history of giving away, selling or otherwise

disbursing of his personal tickets, and the Defendant's refusal to cooperate in obtaining Plaintiffs
one-third of the play-off tickets, the Plaintiff believes that the Defendant, unless enjoined from doing
so, will obtain all of the Utah Jazz basketball tickets for the upcoming season and for all further
seasons and give, sell or otherwise disburse said tickets in a manner such that the Plaintiff will not
be able to acquire and use them. Plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm if he is unable to obtain his
one-third of the tickets because there are no other comparable season ticket seats available for
purchase, and the Utah Jazz ticket office will not sell the tickets to Plaintiff.
16.

The 1995-1996 Jazz season tickets will go on sale in the next few days and

will be available for Mr. Eardley to pick up at the Utah Jazz office. Unless restrained from doing
so, Plaintiff believes that the Defendant will take all of the 1995-1996 season tickets and not give
one-third of them to the Plaintiff but will use them in a manner such that Plaintiff will not be able
to acquire or use them.
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17.

Despite repeated demands, Defendant has failed and refused to honor the

terms of the contract as set forth hereinabove and Plaintiff has been damaged in an amount to be
proven at trial.
18.

The injury to Plaintiff of not being able to obtain one-third of these season

tickets out weighs any damage an injunction prohibiting Defendant from keeping them from the
Plaintiff, would cause the Defendant.
19.

A preliminary injunction against the Defendant would not be adverse to the

public interest and there is a substantial likelihood that Plaintiff will prevail on the merits.
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF
20.

The Plaintiff incorporates herein by referenced paragraphs 1 through 19 set

forth hereinabove.
21.

Defendant has breached the contract with the Plaintiff and as a result of

Defendant's breach of the contract, the Plaintiff has suffered damages in an amount to be proven at
trial.
22.

The Defendant is liable to the Plaintiff for said damages and is entitled to

judgment therefor.
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF
23.

The Plaintiff incorporates herein by referenced paragraphs 1 through 22 set

forth hereinabove.
24.

Pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 65A, Plaintiff is entitled to a

preliminary injunction enjoining the Defendant from selling, giving away, disbursing or dividing or
Page 5 of 8
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in any other manner, using Plaintiffs one-third of the 1995-1996 Utah Jazz basketball tickets and
all later year's basketball tickets including play-off tickets. Such preliminary injunction should
continue until such time as the Court has ruled on the rights of the parties and ordered judgment
accordingly.
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF
25.

The Plaintiff incorporates herein by referenced paragraphs 1 through 24 set

forth hereinabove.
26.

Pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 57 and Utah Code Annotated 78-33-

1 et sefl., Plaintiff is entitled to a declaratory judgment declaring that there exists a valid and binding
contract between the Plaintiff and the Defendant, the terms of which are set forth hereinabove, that
Plaintiff is entitled to one-third of the Utah Jazz basketball tickets, both for the regular season and
play-off games for all coming years of the Utah Jazz basketball season, that the Defendant has
breached said contract and for an order of this Court directing and ordering the Defendant divide
with the Plaintiff one-third of all said tickets for all forthcoming seasons.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff prays for judgment as follows:
1.

For damages against the Defendant for breach of contract as may be proved

2.

For a preliminary injunction preventing the Defendant from selling, using,

at trial.

giving away or in any other manner, disposing Plaintiffs one-third of the Utah Jazz basketball
tickets for all coming seasons.
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3.

For a declaratory judgment declaring that a valid and binding contract exists

between the Plaintiff and the Defendant under which the Plaintiff is entitled to one-third of all Jazz
basketball tickets, both regular season and play-off for all coming seasons.
4.

For costs and attorneys' fees incurred in bringing this action.

5.

For all such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

DATED this J2_ day of

Ufa

1995.

STATE OF UTAH
).ss
County of Salt Lake

LARRY CLAYTON, being duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:
That he is the Plaintiff in the above-captioned matter and has read the foregoing
Verified Complaint and knows the contents thereof and that the same is true of his own knowledge
and belief.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this (~? day of JL/4^

. 1995.

/</?/«'£fr??C4
Notary Public
J
MARY KAY WILLIAMS 1
21M S o u * 1300 East #5201
Soft Uko City, Utah M1Q6 !
My Commission Expires \

Page 7 of 8

^

L

Mvthft. 19f9

|

TAYLOR, ENNENGA, ADAMS & LOWE

L. M^jrk Ferre
Attorneys for the Plaintiff

603980 c

Page 8 of 8
<?

ANDREA NUFFER [6623]
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant
4543 South 700 East, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 263-3344
Telefax:
(801) 263-1010
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LARRY CLAYTON,

:
AFFIDAVIT OF KIP EARDLEY

Plaintiff,
vs.
KIP EARDLEY

:
:

Case No. 950903536

:

JUDGE WILLIAM B. BOHLING

Defendant.
STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
KIP EARDLEY, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and
states as follows:
1.

In approximately 1984 or 19 85,«Affiant purchased season

tickets with the Utah Jazz basketball franchise in Affiant's name
only.
2.

It has been Affiant's experience that after purchasing

season tickets from the Utah Jazz, Affiant was offered season
tickets by the Utah Jazz in subsequent years, which tickets gave
Affiant substantially similar or better seating positions than the
previous year(s).

EARDLEY.AFF (AN)
NE001-06436
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3.

Affiant believes that the Utah Jazz reserves the right to

refuse to sell season tickets to anyone.
4.

In approximately 1989, Affiant began offering to sell

one-third of Affiant's season tickets to Larry Clayton ("Clayton")
on a yearly basis.
5.

Clayton accepted Affiant's offers each year for the years

1989 through the 1994-95 season.
6.

After the 1994-95 regular season, Affiant decided not to

offer to sell any more of Affiant's tickets to Clayton.
7.

In approximately February of 199 5, Affiant sold all of

his interest

in his Jazz tickets and any seating priorities

attendant thereto to an unrelated third party.
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT.
DATED this

I

day of Jun&, 19J

V (.Cue)
KIP 'EARDLEY

%

ACKNOWLEDGED before me this /y^C day of June, 1995 by KIP
EARDLEY.

My Commission Expires:

NOTARY BUBUCv?residing at:
7^

tfterfte
,<p£S?\
f&&£$'A

(si 1**4)-)

dhiirffc
ANDPEA NUFFER
Not-ary Public

STA f& CF UTAH

k

V * y ^ > t V / v Tcmrn Expires OCT 22. i997j
^ S ^ ' 4 ^ 2 S /00 E *200SLCUT 84107]
+ w + M w m •» 'P + » » + * w

EARDLEY.AFF (AN)
NE001 06436
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and
foregoing Affidavit of Kip Eardley in Case No. 950903536 was
mailed, United States Mail, postage prepaid, the JrK-^6.a.v of June,
1995, to the following:
L. Mark Ferre, Esq.
TAYLOR, ENNENGA, ADAMS & LOWE
2180 South 1300 East, Suite-3S©-5V?0
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
<
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25-5-2. Wills and implied trusts excepted.
Section 25-5-1 shall not be construed to affect the power of
a testator in the disposition of his real estate by last will and
testament; nor to prevent any trust from arising or being
extinguished by implication or operation of law.
1995

TITLE 25
FRAUD
i l P ^ l n r f i i i e n t Conveyances [Repealed].
B K S M e r c h a n d i s e in Bulk [Repealed}.
£ T^iieS and Sales of Livestock [Repealed].
1 ffiSSting Wool [Repealed].
* Statute of Frauds.
S Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act.

25-5-3. Leases a n d contracts for interest in lands.
Every contract for the leasing for a longer period than one
year, or for the sale, of any lands, or any interest in lands, shall
be void unless the contract, or some note or memorandum
thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party by whom the
lease or sale is to be made, or by his lawful agent thereunto
authorized in writing.
1953

CHAPTER 1

25-5-4.

Certain agreements void unless written and
signed.
The following agreements are void unless the agreement, or
some note or memorandum of the agreement, is in writing,
signed by the party to be charged with the agreement:
(1) every agreement that by its terms is not to be
performed within one year from the making of the agreement;
(2) every promise to answer for the debt, default, or
miscarriage of another;
(3) every agreement, promise, or undertaking made
upon consideration of marriage, except mutual promises
to marry;
(4) every special promise made by an executor or administrator to answer in damages for the liabilities, or to
pay the debts, of the testator or intestate out of his own
estate;
(5) every agreement authorizing or employing an agent
or broker to purchase or sea real estate for compensation;
(6) every credit agreement.
(a) As used in Subsection (6):
(i) "Credit agreement" means an agreement by
a financial institution to lend, delay, or otherwise
modify an obligation to repay money, goods, or
things in action, to otherwise extend credit, or to
make any other financial accommodation.
"Credit agreement" does not include the usual
and customary agreements related to deposit
accounts or overdrafts'or other terms associated
with deposit accounts or overdrafts.
(ii) "Creditor" means a financial institution
which extends credit or extends a financial accommodation under a credit agreement with a
debtor.
(iii) "Debtor" means a person who seeks or
obtains credit, or seeks or receives a financial
accommodation, under a credit agreement with a
financial institution.
(iv) "Financial institution" means a state or
federally chartered bank, savings and loan association, savings bank, industrial loan corporation, credit union, or any other institution under
the jurisdiction of the commissioner of Financial
Institutions as provided in Title 7, Financial
Institutions Act of 1981.
(b) A debtor or a creditor may not maintain an
action on a credit agreement unless the agreement is
in writing, expresses consideration, sets forth the
relevant terms and conditions, and is signed by the
party against whom enforcement of the agreement
would be sought. For purposes of this act, a signed
application constitutes a signed agreement, if the
creditor does not customarily obtain an additional

FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES
(Repealed by Laws 1988, ch. 59, § 16.)
25-1-1 to 25-1-16. Repealed.
CHAPTER 2
SALE OF MERCHANDISE IN BULK
(Repealed by Laws 1965, ch. 154, § 10-102.)
25-2-1 to 25-2-5. Repealed.
CHAPTER 3
LEASES AND SALES OF LIVESTOCK
(Repealed by Laws 1965, ch. 154, § 10-102.)
25-3-1 to 25-3-4. Repealed.
CHAPTER 4
MARKETING WOOL
(Repealed by Laws 1965, ch. 154, § 10-102.)
25-4-1 to 25-4-3.

Repealed.
CHAPTERS
STATUTE OF FRAUDS

Section
25-5-1.
25-5-2.
25-5-3.
25-5-4.
25-5-5.
25-5-6.
25-5-7.
25-5-8.
25-5-9.

Estate or interest in real property.
Wills and implied trusts excepted.
Leases and contracts for interest in lands.
Certain agreements void unless written and signed.
Representation as to credit of third person.
Promise to answer for obligation of another
When not required to be in writing.
Contracts by telegraph deemed written.
Right to specific performance not affected.
Agent may sign for principal.

25-5-1. Estate or interest in real property.
No estate or interest in real property, other than leases for
a term not exceeding one year, nor any trust or power over or
concerning real property or in any manner relating thereto,
shall be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or declared
otherwise than by act or operation of law, or by deed or
conveyance in writing subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or by his
lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing.
1953

1

25-5-5

FRAUD

signed agreement from the debtor when granting the
application.
(c) The following actions do not give rise to a claim
that a credit agreement is created, unless the agreement satisfies the requirements of Subsection (b):
(i) the rendering of financial advice by a creditor to a debtor;
(ii) the consultation by a creditor with a
debtor; or
(iii) the creation for any purpose between a
creditor and a debtor of fiduciary or other business relationships.
(d) Each credit agreement shall contain a clearly
stated typewritten or printed provision giving notice
to the debtor that the written agreement is a final
expression of the agreement between the creditor and
debtor and the written agreement may not be contradicted by evidence of any alleged oral agreement. The
provision does not have to be on the promissory note
or other evidence of indebtedness that is tied to the
credit agreement.
1989
25-5-5. Representation as to credit of third person.
lb charge a person upon a representation as to the credit of
a third person, such representation, or some memorandum
thereof, must be in writing subscribed by the party to be
charged therewith.
1953
25-5-6. Promise to answer for obligation of another —
When not required to be in writing.
A promise to answer for the obligation of another in any of
the following cases is deemed an original obligation of the
Promisor and need not be in writing:
(1) Where the promise is made by one who has received
property of another upon an undertaking to apply it
pursuant to such promise, or by one who has received a
discharge from an obligation in whole or in part in
consideration of such promise.
(2) Where the creditor parts with value or enters into
an obligation in consideration of the obligation in respect
to which the promise is made in terms or under circumstances such as to render the party making the promise
the principal debtor and the person in whose behalf it is
made his surety.
(3) Where the promise, being for an antecedent obligation of another, is made upon the consideration that the
party receiving it cancel the antecedent obligation, accepting the new promise as a substitute therefor; or upon the
consideration that the party receiving it releases the
property of another from a levy or his person from
imprisonment under an execution on a judgment obtained
upon the antecedent obligation; or upon a consideration
6enefTciaif to the promisor, wnetner moving from eitner
party to the antecedent obligation or from another person.
(4) Where a factor undertakes for a commission to sell
merchandise and to guarantee the sale.
(5) When the holder of an instrument for the payment
of money upon which a third person is or may become
liable to him transfers it in payment of a precedent debt of
his own, or for a new consideration, and in connection
with such transfer enters into a promise respecting such
instrument.
1953
25-5-7. Contracts by telegraph deemed written.
Contracts made by telegraph shall be deemed to be cont a c t s in writing, and all communications sent by telegraph
f n.d signed by the person sending the same, or by his authorl
ty shall be deemed to be communications in writing.
195s

2

25-5-8. Right to specific performance not affected.
Nothinjr in this chapter contained shall be construed to
abridge the powers of courts to compel the specific performance of agreements in case of part performance thereof.
1953

25-5-9. Agent may sign for principal.
Every instrument required by the provisions of this chapter
to be subscribed by any party may be subscribed by the lawful
agent of such party.
1953
CHAPTER 6
UNIFORM FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT
Section
25-6-1.
25-6-2.
25-6-3.
25-6-4.
25-6-5.
25-6-6.
25-6-7.
25-6-8.
25-6-9.
25-6-10.
25-6-11.
25-6-12.
25-6-13.

Short title.
Definitions.
Insolvency.
Value — Transfer.
Fraudulent transfer — Claim arising before or
after transfer.
Fraudulent transfer — Claim arising before
transfer.
Transfer — When made.
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25-6-1. Short title.
This chapter is known as the "Uniform Fraudulent Transfer
Act."
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25-6-2. Definitions.
In this chapter:
(1) "Affiliate" means:
(a) a person who directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds with power to vote, 20% or more of the
outstanding voting securities of the debtor, other
than a person who holds the securities:
(i) as a fiduciary or agent without sole discretionary power to vote the securities; or
(ii) solely to secure a debt, if the person has
not exercised the power to vote;
(b) a corporation 20% or more of whose outstanding voting securities are directly or indirectly owned,
controlled, or held with power to vote, by the debtor or
a person who directly or indirectly owns, controls, or
holds, with power to vote, 20% or more of the outstanding voting securities of the debtor, other than a
person who holds the securities:
(i) as a fiduciary or agent without sole power
to vote the securities; or
(ii) solely to secure a debt, if the person has
not exercised the power to vote;
(c) a person whose business is operated by the
debtor under a lease or other agreement, or a person
substantially all of whose assets are controlled by the
debtor; or
(d) a person who operates the debtor's business
under a lease or other agreement or controls substantially all of the debtor's assets.
(2) "Asset" means property of a debtor, but does not
include:
(a) property to the extent it is encumbered by a
valid lien;

